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Abstract 
Sharing of files is a major application of computer networks, with examples ranging from LAN-based 
network file systems to wide-area applications such as use of version control systems in distributed 
software development. Identification, authentication and access control are much more challenging in 
this complex large-scale distributed environment. In this paper, we introduce the Distributed Credential 
Filesystem (DisCFS). Under DisCFS, credentials are used to identify both the files stored in the file system 
and the users that are permitted to access them, as well as the circumstances under which such access 
is allowed. As with traditional capabilities, users can delegate access rights (and thus share information) 
simply by issuing new credentials. Credentials allow files to be accessed by remote users that are not 
known a priori to the server. Our design achieves an elegant separation of policy and mechanism which is 
mirrored in the implementation. Our prototype implementation of DisCFS runs under OpenBSD 2.8, using 
a modified user-level NFS server. Our measurements suggest that flexible and secure file sharing can be 
made scalable at a surprisingly low performance cost. 
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Abstract that flexible and secure file sharing can be made 
scalable at a surprisingly low performance cost. 
Sharing of files is a major application of com- ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ d ~ :  Filesystems, access control, 
puter networks, with examples ranging from n u s t  Management, KeyNote, OpenBSD , cre- 
LAN-based network file systems to wide-area ap- dentials. 
plications such as use of version control systems 
in distributed software development. Identifica- 
tion, authentication and access control are much 1 IntrOduct ion 
more challenging in this complex large-scale dis- 
tributed environment. The widespread use of the Internet demonstrates 
In this paper, we introduce the Distributed the importance of information sharing. This 
Credential Filesystem (DisCFS). Under DisCFS, widespread use has also spurred a shift from its 
credentials are used to identify both the files original use as an open network where informa- 
stored in the file system and the users that are tion was freely available, towards one where var- 
permitted to access them, as well as the circum- ious organizations and users wish to share in- 
stances under which such access is allowed. AS formation under some (often restrictive) policy. 
with traditional capabilities, users can delegate It has proven very difficult, in practice, to make 
access rights (and thus share information) sim- even the simplest policies scalable and secure. In 
ply by issuing new credentials. Credentials allow many respects, this is due to both the complex- 
files to be accessed by remote users that are not ity of the distributed environment and the need 
known a pm'ori to the server. Our design achieves to specify and enforce global policies on informa- 
an elegant separation of policy and mechanism tion sharing. 
which is mirrored in the implementation. In this paper we present a system that al- 
Our prototype implementation of IlisCFS lows file sharing to be performed between users 
runs under OpenBSD 2-83 using a ~~~odi f ied  us r- of different domains without the intervention of 
level NFS server- Our rmasurements suggest the administrators of their systems. The system 
 hi^ work was supported by DARPA under contrXt stores access permissions on special certificates 
F39502-99-1-0512-MOD P0001. that are issued by users. For example, if Alice 
wants to read Bob's paper, Bob only has to issue 
the appropriate credential and send it to Alice 
(e.g., via email). 
We will show that this simple mechanism is 
secure and scalable. Further, by requiring the 
cooperation of only the users involved in the file 
exchange, this mechanism offers great flexibil- 
ity and low administrative overheads. Access to 
the files may be monitored by the system and 
the entity issuing the requests may be identified 
through its public key. Mechanisms for restrict- 
ing access or imposing access controls are also 
provided. 
We have integrated our access mechanism with 
a user-level NFSv2 server running on many Unix 
systems including OpenBSD 2.8 [2]. The perfor- 
mance measurements collected by running com- 
mon file related benchmarks indicate that our 
approach is very efficient. We endeavor to even- 
tually offer this access mechanism as part of the 
standard NFS authentication framework. 
Organization The paper is organized into six 
further sections. The next section provides a 
more complete motivation for our system. Sec- 
tion 3 discusses related work. Sections 4 and 5 
describe our design and implementation under 
the OpenBSD operating system. Section 6 eval- 
uates the system using both micro- and macre 
benchmarks. Finally Section 7 concludes the pa- 
per with a summary of our results and our future 
plans. 
2 Motivation 
Existing systems have several major shortcom- 
ings in when used to carry out information shar- 
ing tasks: 
First, traditional user authentication implies 
that the user is known to the system, before file 
requests can be processed. However, the com- 
monly used information access model on the Web 
is that browsers can download pages from Web 
servers without prior registration (i.e., anony- 
mously). 
Second, file and directory permissions are in- 
herited from multi-user computer operating sys- 
tems. Sharing is achieved by either account shar- 
ing (which is extremely ill-advised, as it defeats 
accountability) or through the use of group ac- 
cess permissions on files and directories. How- 
ever, group permissions assume the intervention 
of the system administrator for creating the user 
accounts, and adding the appropriate users to 
the correct groups. Such permissions lack flexi- 
bility and granularity, and perhaps most impor- 
tant, extensibility: there is no way of adding 
new permissions if the existing ones prove in- 
adequate. 
The third and most important shortcoming 
is the extensive administrative intervention re- 
quired for file sharing to work, such as password 
and group password files. Where users belong to 
a common organization this is not a severe prob- 
lem. Yet, if users from separate organizations 
wish to share files, the administrative complex- 
ity rapidly blooms into impossibility. 
A typical example is as follows: Bob, a sales- 
man, would like some clients to be able to have 
access to advance information about a prod- 
uct. Since the information is not intended to be 
widely available, Bob will have to place the lit- 
erature in a restricted part of the corporate Web 
site and make arrangements so that only the des- 
ignated clients have access to the material. The 
traditional way of doing things implies that ac- 
counts and passwords are created and handed 
over to the users. A more sophisticated way of 
achieving the same goal would be to use X.509 [7] 
credentials for user authentication. While this 
approach addresses some of the well-known se- 
curity problems of password authentication, it 
leaves much to be desired in terms of flexibility 
and required administrative intervention. 
For example, accounts must still be set up on 
the server, placing additional burdens on the ad- 
ministrators who now must maintain yet another 
list of users. The other problem relates to the ac- 
tual management of permissions that are given 
to these credentials; Bob will have to go through 
his client list and tell the administrators who can 
access what, thus generating an access list that 
matches credentials to permissions. While this 
approach may work for small groups of clients, 
it does not scale well. 
To have effective sharing of information while 
maintaining control over who has access requires 
that a number of requirements must be met. For 
convenience, we distinguish internal and exter- 
nal users. Internal users are those who have ac- 
counts on the system. These users can create 
files and assign access permissions to them. Ex- 
ternal users do not have accounts and are oth- 
erwise unknown to the system. In our previous 
example Bob would be an internal user, while his 
clients would be external users. We assume that 
the number of local users is minute compared to 
the number of external users. With this defini- 
tion in mind, the requirements are as follows: 
Default policy. The administrator should be 
able to specify the default access policies for 
the entire system. Since these vary between 
sites, the system should not make assump- 
tions. 
Scaling. The system should be able to cope 
with large numbers of files and even larger 
number of users accessing those files. 
There should be no involvement of the ad- 
ministrators in the process of allowing exter- 
nal users access to files in the system. The 
users themselves should be able to authorize 
access to files by external users. 
Apart horn the actual files, the system 
should maintain as little additional state as 
possible. 
Delegation is extremely important for the 
operation of the system, since there is al- 
ready an implicit delegation of access au- 
thority from the administrators to the local 
users and from the local users to external 
users. 
The file access conditions must be flexible 
and expandable. In any case there should 
be no constrains by the system as to what 
conditions may be imposed for access. 
The access mechanism should work for both 
centralized servers and in a distributed en- 
vironment where the files are stored in mul- 
tiple servers. 
Before we continue with the description of the 
Distributed Credential File System (DisCFS), 
which was designed and implemented to meet 
the listed requirements, we will discuss previous 
work done in the area of wide area file sharing. 
3 Related Work 
Network file sharing is an area that has attracted 
a lot of attention given the need for informa- 
tion exchange. The explosion in the growth of 
the Internet over the past several years, and the 
projections that the growth will continue at a 
similar pace, makes file sharing an even more 
important issue. There are however a number of 
problems in the proposed and already existing 
sharing mechanisms. 
3.1 File Systems 
Network file systems, like NFS and AFS [16, 101 
are the most popular and widespread mecha- 
nisms for sharing files in tight administration do- 
mains. However, crossing administrative bound- 
aries creates numerous administrative problems 
(e.g., merging distinct Kerberos [14] realms or 
NIS domains). 
Encrypting file systems like CFS [3] place 
great emphasis on maintaining the privacy of the 
user information by encrypting the file names 
and their contents. The limitation of such sys- 
tems is that sharing is particularly difficult to im- 
plement; the file owner must somehow commu- 
nicate the secret encryption key for the file to all 
the users that wish to access it. Even then, tra- 
ditional access controls must still be used to en- 
force access restrictions (e.g., read-only, append- 
only, immutable file, etc.). Our system assumes 
that the server is trustworthy, so that the files 
can be stored in clear text. CFS-like encryption 
mechanisms may still be used on top of DisCFS. 
The concept of credential-based access control 
appears also in the Exokernel. [13]. In this sys- 
tem, users can create new capabilities at will, 
but the new capability must be dominated by 
an existing one. This is similar to our chains 
of certificates, but is rather limited by the fact 
that permissions are hardwired into the system, 
the hierarchical capability tree may be up to 
8 levels deep, and the access-list based control 
mechanism is inflexible. In our system, certifi- 
cate chains can be of arbitrary length, and the 
access policy can consider factors such as time- 
of-day, so that, for example, leisure-related files 
may not be available during office hours. 
WebFS is part of the larger WebOS[17] project 
at UC Berkeley. It implements a network file 
system on top of the HTTP protocol. WebFS 
relies on user level HTTP servers, used to trans- 
fer data, along with a kernel module that im- 
plements the file system. Access control lists 
(ACLs) are associated with each file that enu- 
merate users who have read, write, or exe- 
cute permission on individual files. Users are 
uniquely identified by their public keys. We have 
taken a more general and scalable approach in 
that there is no need for ACLs since each cre- 
dential is sufficient to identify both the users and 
their privileges. 
The system that is most closely related to 
our work is the secure file system, or SFS 
[12]. SF'S introduces the notion of self-certifging 
pathnamesfile names that effectively contain 
the appropriate remote server's public key. In 
this way SFS needs no separate key manage- 
ment machinery to communicate securely with 
file servers. Our DisCFS goes a step further. It 
uses credentials to identify both the files stored 
in the file system and the users that are per- 
mitted to access them, as well as the circum- 
stances under which such access is allowed. Fur- 
thermore, users can delegate access rights simply 
by issuing new credentials, providing a natural 
and very scalable way of sharing information. 
3.2 Other Protocols 
To share files across wide area networks a num- 
ber of protocols have been deployed, the most 
commonly used ones being FTP and HTTP 
[15, 81. Anonymous FTP, where there is no need 
for authentication, offers total flexibility since 
any user can download or upload files to FTP 
servers. Similarly in the Web architecture, ac- 
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Figure 1: Delegation of privileges, from the 
administrator to Bob, and then to Alice. 
cess is either anonymous or subject to some sort 
of ad-hoc authentication mechanism. This con- 
figuration is useful only in the case where file 
content is non-critical. In the case where authen- 
tication is required, the flexibility is reduced to 
an absolute minimum. The only users allowed to 
access the server, in that case, are users that are 
already known to the system. This, as is the case 
with existing network file systems, limits the col- 
laboration possibilities only between users in the 
same administration domain. 
4 DisCFS Design 
4.1 System Architecture 
The basic principle behind DisCFS is Trust Man- 
agement [5, 6, 41. Trust Management dispenses 
with unique names as an indirect means for per- 
forming access control. Instead, it uses a direct 
binding between a public key and a set of autho- 
rizations. This results in an extremely decentral- 
ized authorization system that is flexible enough 
to cope with a large variety of authentication 
scenarios. 
Rather than having users authenticated by 
the system and then checking access lists to see 
whether their requests should be honored or not, 
our system is based entirely on keys and autho- 
rizations. User requests are signed by the user's 
key and must be accompanied by other creden- 
tials that form a chain of trust linking the user's 
key to a key that is trusted by the system. In 
our first example in Section 1, we looked at Bob's 
predicament in trying to allow his clients access 
to internal files. Utilizing a trust management 
system, the server would trust only the adminis- 
trator's key. Bob will be given a credential that 
binds Bob's key with the files in question and is 
signed by the administrator. The credential may 
allow Bob read and write access to the files. 
If Bob then wishes Alice to be able to only read 
these files, he will simply need to create a new 
credential which will grant Alice's key read ac- 
cess to the files. Alice will issue a request signed 
by her key. If Alice's request is to be honored by 
the system, it has to be accompanied by Bob's 
credential. This credential forms a link between 
the external user (Alice) and the internal user 
(Bob). Bob's own credential (issued by the ad- 
ministrator) must also be available, to link the 
internal user to the administrator. Thus, Alice's 
request must be accompanied by both creden- 
tials in order to be granted (see Figure 1). Cre- 
dential caching may be used to reduce the num- 
ber of credentials that have to be exchanged. 
It is interesting to observe that in DisCFS the 
traditional problem of credential (or certificate) 
revocation is fairly straightforward to address: 
since the credentials related to a specific file have 
to be examined by the DisCFS server where the 
file is stored, revocation (especially if it is infre- 
quent) can be done by notifying the server about 
IPsec 
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Figure 2: Client establishes IPsec connection 
with DisCFS server. Figure 3: Client sends file-related credentials 
to the DisCFS server; file becomes visible to 
client. 
bad keys or credentials. If the credentials are rel- 
atively short-lived, the server need only remem- 
ber such information for a short period of time. 
In order to be able to express access rights 
and the diverse conditions under which these are 
granted, we need some form of policy definition store information about every Person or 
language. In our system we use the Keynote that may need to retrieve a file. We also provide 
trust management system [4] for this purpose. Our users with the ability to propagate access to 
the files by simply passing on (delegating) their 
rights to other users. In this way users pass cre- 
4.2 KeyNote in DisCFS dentials rather than passwords, thus allowing the 
The basic service provided by the KeyNote sys- system to associate access requests with keys and 
tem is compliance checking; that is, checking also to be able to reconstruct the authorization 
whether a proposed action conforms to policy. path from the administrator to the user making 
Actions in KeyNote are specified as a set of the request. The system may not know that Al- 
name-value pairs, called an action attribute set. ice is trying to get at a file, but it can log that key 
Policies are written in the KeyNote assertion lan- A (Alice's key) was used and that key B (Bob's 
guage and either accept or reject action attribute key) authorized the operation. 
sets presented to it (non-binary results are also 
possible). Policies can be broken up and dis- During the writing of this paper we encoun- 
tributed as credentials, which are signed asser- tered one obvious application of our system. The 
tions that can be sent over a network and to administrator of the host that we were using for 
which a local policy can defer in making its de- editing the paper had failed to create a group for 
cisions. The credential mechanism allows for ar- all of us. Since we could not find a group that we 
bitrarily complex graphs of trust, in which cre- all belonged to, the only way for all of us to be 
dentials signed by several entities are considered able to access the CVS repository with the files 
when authorizing actions. was to make them world writable. If the central 
The advantage of using Keynote is that we no server supported DisCFS then the owner of the 
longer need to have a priori knowledge of the repository would simply need to issue read-write 
user base. Thus, the system does not need to certificates to all the other authors. 
4.3 DisCFS over NFS lPsec connection 
As the actual network filesystem we use NFS. 
This allows for easy integration into existing sys- 
tems without need for extensive upgrades. More- 
over, the entire scheme works with both mono- DisCFS Client 
u 
DisCFS Server 
lithic and distributed servers. Since the servers 
do not need to share information about users, Figure 4: Client sends read requests, server 
there is no synchronization overhead. Each sends file blocks to client if policy allows the 
repository is responsible for only the part of the 
operation. distributed filesystem that is stored locally and 
there is no need to distribute and synchronize 
authentication and access control databases (like 
NIS). a A secure link between the client and the 
The NFS protocol is particularly suitable for server is established so that subsequent 
communications are secure. 
our needs for the following reasons: 
a All requests coming over the IPsec link can 
a NFS is widely used and supported by nu- be safely assumed to come from the autho- 
merous ~latforms. . - 
rized user. 
a The NFS protocol is portable, stable and 
reliable. 
a The NFS server is available as a user level 
program, so development is possible with- 
out modifications to the operating system 
kernel. This is particularly useful since it 
is not always possible to have access to the 
operating system source. 
Like NFS, the DisCFS system consists of a 
client and a server. The client runs on the user 
When a file is stored in DisCFS, a credential 
is generated containing information that allows 
the future retrieval of the file contents as well 
as information about the file creator. Since the 
entire DisCFS closely follows NFS semantics, it 
appears to the user as another mounted file sys- 
tem. Files for which credentials have been sup- 
plied appear under the mount point of the Dis- 
CFS file system. It is important to note that 
without the credential, retrieval of the file is not 
possible. 
workstation and establishes a connection to the Once the user submits the necessary file ere- 
DisCFS server. We use IPsec [ l : L ]  for the connec- denti& (Figure 3, the file will appear under the 
tion between the client and the server (a shown DisCFS mount point using the same name it had 
in Figure 2) thus ensuring the following: when its credential was created. The client may 
then use file 110 requests similar to NFS (Figure 
a User authentication is handled through the 4). The system also permits the user to override 
creation of the IPsec Security Associations the default file name and allows files to be placed 
between the client and the server. in user-specified locations. 
5 Implementation Details 
We built our implementation of DisCFS by mod- 
ifying the existing user-level daemon of the cryp 
tographic file system CFS [3]. In the prototype, 
we replaced the encryption functionality of CFS 
with the access control mechanism described in 
Section 4. For our platform, we used OpenBSD 
2.8 [2] since it already contains several impor- 
tant components of our system, such as IPsec 
and KeyNote. However, the implementation is 
fairly portable across different systems. 
The main task in implementing DisCFS was 
the integration of KeyNote credentials with NFS. 
To that end, we used a modified version of the 
CFS cattach utility that sets up an IPsec tun- 
nel between the client system and the DisCFS 
server and attaches the remote directory over 
the IPsec connection. This allows the DisCFS 
server retrieve the public key used for authen- 
tication in the IKE [9] protocol (as part of the 
IPsec key establishment phase) and associate it 
with a unix-style userid. Future NFS requests 
are protected with IPsec, allowing the DisCFS 
server to associate them with the public key of 
the user. 
As a result of the attach operation, the de- 
sired directory would appear under the default 
DisCFS mount point (e.g., /discfs). However, 
since the user has not provided a KeyNote cre- 
dential assertion, the file permissions of the at- 
tached directory are set to 000 (meaning no ac- 
cess is granted). The file/directory ownership is 
set to the userid provided during the attach op- 
eration. This value has no local significance for 
the DisCFS server, and thus no prior arrange- 
ment with the system administrator is needed. 
Similarly, no file ownership conflicts are possible; 
the userid is irrelevant to the DisCFS server, and 
is only manipulated in this way to make possible 
the use of unmodified NFS clients. 
To get any privileges to the attached directory 
or any other files/directories in it, the user would 
have to have a credential like the one shown in 
Figure 5. This credential was issued by the ad- 
ministrator (as identified by the public key ap- 
pearing in the Authorizer field) to a specific user 
(as identified by the public key appearing in the 
Licensees field), and contains enough informa- 
tion for the DisCFS server to determine what 
permissions should be granted to the client sys- 
tem. A fileldirectory is identified by a handle, 
which, in our prototype implementation, is sim- 
ply the inode number of the fileldirectory on the 
server. This handle is used by the DisCFS server 
to locate the actual file in its local file storage. 
The handle specifics need to be changed in the 
future since inodes are not suitable as globally 
unique identifier across a network. A possible 
solution would be to build a handle from the in- 
ode number and a generation number, similar to 
the 4.4 BSD NFS implementation. 
The credential assertions in our implemen- 
tation grant standard unix permissions. The 
return values for the assertions form a partial 
order of 8 combinations ( "false", "X", "W", 
"WX ," R" ," R X  ," RW" and " RWX" ) and trans- 
late directly into the standard octal representa- 
tion. Thus, in the credential of Figure 5 the user 
is granted read, write, and execute access on the 
testdir directory. We wrote a utility which al- 
lows a user to submit credential assertions to the 
DisCFS daemon over RPC. Succesfully submit- 
ted credential assertions are added to a persis- 
tent KeyNote session. Following this operation, 
the permissions of the attached directory are 
changed accordingly. When read or write oper- 
ations occur however, the KeyNote is consulted 
again on whether the specific requests should be 
granted; thus, the DisCFS server does not have 
Authorizer: 1~dsa-hex:3081de0240503ca3b98b754259d8b3bdd6ed396O~~ 
Licensees: 1'dsa-hex:308lde02405be60a70c532le7fd20fd4dOd2a4f611 
Conditions: (app-domain == LIDisCFS" ) && 
(HANDLE == "666240") -> "RWX" ; 
Comment : "testdir" 
signature: "sig-dsa-shal-hex:302e021500eebl5aflal0980017164911 
Figure 5: KeyNote credential granting user miltchev access to directory testdir. The keys and 
signatures have been truncated in the interest of readability. 
to trust the client to enforce the file permissions. 
To improve performance, we use a cache of re- 
quested operations and policy results. 
It should also be noted that some of the proce- 
dures defined by the NFS protocol do not make 
semantic sense for our implementation. For ex- 
ample, since access control is managed through 
credential assertions the setattr procedure be- 
comes superfluous. The careful reader will also 
notice that there is a problem with the cre- 
ate and mkdir procedures. A user could cre- 
ate a file in the attached directory since he has 
read, write, and execute access. However, he 
would not be able to access the newly created 
file since he would not have a credential as- 
sertion for it. Thus, we had to add our own 
procedures that upon successfull creation of a 
file/directory return a credential with full access 
to the creator of the file. The owner can then 
issue other credentials further delegating access 
to this fileldirectory. 
6 Experiment a1 Evaluation 
While the architectural discussion is largely 
qualitative, some estimates of the system per- 
formance are useful. With a design such as this, 
the most useful data would be system bench- 
Alice 
450MHz lntel PI11 
Server 128MB SDRAM 
Quantum Fireball CTlO 
100Mbps Ethernet I 
Client 
Bob 
4OOMHz lntel PI1 
256MB SDRAM 
Figure 6: Experimental setup. Alice is the ma- 
chine that hosts the server and Bob is used as 
the client. Local file system experiments were 
performed on Alice. 
marks for applications in distributed environ- 
ments. We performed several experiments, both 
micro-benchmarks and macro-benchmarks, to 
get a quantitative evaluation. The experiments 
are focused on any possible performance over- 
heads introduced by our access control mecha- 
nism. 
Our test machines are x86 architecture ma- 
chines running 0 penBSD 2.8 and interconnected 
by 100 Mbps Ethernet. More specifically, in the 
two-host tests (source to sink) that explore the 
network performance of our system, Alice is an 
450 MHz Intel PI11 with 128MB of memory and 
a Quantum Fireball CTlO 9.6GB, and serves as 
the sink. Bob, the source, is a 400 MHz Intel 
PI1 with 256MB of memory (see Figure 6). The 
single host tests, that explore the storage perfor- 
mance of our system were performed on Alice. 
Our prototype system is running on Alice, with 
Bob playing the role of the client. 
In the following tables, FFS means measure- 
ments taken on the local file system. CFS-NE is 
our base case: it is basically CFS with encryption 
turned off and modified to run remotely. The 
server was running on Alice and the client on 
Bob. Finally DbCFS is our prototype. 
The Bonnie benchmark [I] was used in order 
to evaluate the performance when writing and 
reading a very large file (100MB). Figures 7, 8, 
and 9 present results for single-character writes, 
block writes and re-writes respectively. The re- 
sults for single character reads and block reads 
are presented in Figures 10 and 11. The perfor- 
mance advantage of the local file system (FFS) 
comes as no surprise. However, this benchmark 
demonstrates that the read and write perfor- 
mance of CFS- NE and Dis CFS is virtually iden- 
tical. Hence, we can conclude that the over- 
head incurred by the KeyNote credential lookups 
when using cached policy results is minimal. 
To test file system search performance we used 
a simple script that goes through every .c and 
.h file of the OpenBSD kernel source code and 
Filesystem: FFS CFS-NE DisCFS 
Figure 7: Bonnie Sequential Output (Char) 
Throughput (100 K/sec) 
Filesystem: 0 FFS C F S N E  a DisCFS 
Figure 8: Bonnie Sequential Output (Block) 
counts the number of lines, words and bytes. 
The test was conducted with a cache size of 128 
policy results. The results are presented in Fig- 
ure 12. As with the micro-benchmarks, CFS-NE 
and DisCFS exhibit practically identical perfor- 
mance characteristics. 
7 Conclusions 
There are three major contributions of this pa- 
per. 
First, we have introduced the idea of a com- 
pletely credential-based mechanism for authen- 
tication and access control of files. We argue 
that this design is a fundament a1 improvement, 
Filesystem: FFS CFS-NE @ DisCFS 
Figure 9: Bonnie Sequential Output (Rewrite) 
as it completely separates the policy for control- 
ling the file (i.e.,  its associated users and access 
rights) from the access control mechanism used 
by the underlying file storage. As we have ar- 
gued in the paper, this gives DisCFS advantages 
in flexibility, security and scalability relative to 
previous designs. 
Second, we have described our DisCFS proto- 
type, which is based on OpenBSD 2.8 and CFS 
[3]. The implementation uses the KeyNote trust 
management system as the basis for robust scal- 
able credential management. It supports com- 
mon unix file operations. The prototype shows 
that it is remarkably easy to both implement 
and deploy DisCFS, as it uses components such 
as NFS and IPsec, which already exist in most 
common operating systems. Furthermore, the 
traditional semantics of the unix filesystem can 
easily be supported by DisCFS. 
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Figure 10: Bonnie Sequential Input (Char) 
Filesystem: 0 FFS CFS-NE DisCFS 
Figure 11: Bonnie Sequential Input (Block) 
Third, we evaluated the system's performance 
with a set of micro-benchmarks which measured 
primitive operations in the context of our access 
control mechanism. This demonstrated that Dis- 
CFS was constrained by the same factors, such 
as remote RPC times, which plague other dis- 
tributed systems. In a second evaluation, we 
compared the performance of DisCFS to CFS, a 
more "macro" benchmark, and showed that the 
performance impact of DisCFS 's enhancements 
is low. 
Among the directions we will pursue for fu- 
ture work are investigation of new file sharing 
policies for unusual scenarios, such as the un- 
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